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THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE CAUSATION 
TEST OF THE FALSE STATEMENT DOCTRINE  
IN SECURITIES LITIGATION IN CHINA 
Ling Dai† 
Abstract:  As part of the reform of China’s centrally planned economy, one of the 
primary purposes in establishing a stock market was to help state-owned enterprises raise 
sufficient capital from the public.  The protection of investors’ interests was not essential 
in the initial contemplation of securities laws, though the listed companies have a duty of 
disclosure under the 1998 Securities Law.  After the Supreme People’s Court 
promulgated its judicial interpretation of the false statement doctrine in civil securities 
cases in 2002, the lower courts started to interpret and apply the elements of the false 
statement doctrine in securities cases brought by public investors to seek civil 
compensation against the listed companies that misrepresented or omitted major 
information.  The causation test of the false statement doctrine is the determinative issue 
in many false statement cases.  This Comment explores the confusion in the causation 
test under the Supreme People’s Court’s judicial interpretation of the false statement 
doctrine, evaluates the application of the causation test in two civil securities cases, and 
argues that a trial court should interpret the causation test in favor of public investors in a 
close case in light of the legislative intent to protect public investors and the practical 
need to reconstruct investors’ confidence in the stock market in China.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, more than eighty listed companies in China’s stock market 
were investigated and penalized by the China’s Securities Regulatory 
Commission (“CSRC”) for fraud, misrepresentation, or non-disclosure of 
material corporate information.1  The stock market in China underwent an 
unprecedented trust crisis,2 and numerous investors who had suffered losses 
started to question the existing model of the stock market.3  In August 2004, 
the Jinan Intermediate People’s Court (the trial court) of Shandong Province 
issued its decision in Zhang He v. Bohai Group.4  This case brought about 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Dongsheng Zang for his guidance and assistance through 
the process of writing this comment.   
1
 Re dian tou shi [Hot Topics], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SEC. DAILY], Jan. 4, 2002, 
available at http://www.cs.com.cn/csnews/20020104/175563.asp. 
2
 Id. See also Shi Guohua, Shichang Zaoyu Nanyi Chengshou de Xinren Zhitong [The Market 
Underwent Unbelievable Pain due to Trust Crisis], RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S NETWORK], available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1041/1042/2773135.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
3
 Re dian tou shi, supra note 1.  
4
 Zhang He su Yinzuo Bohai Yituan [Zhang He v. Bohai Group] (Jinan Interm. People’s Ct., Aug. 4, 
2004) (hereinafter Bohai Group).  Different from U.S. courts, Chinese courts publicize a very small number 
of cases.  This case has not been publicized by the court.  All the discussions of the case in this comment 
are based on the information collected from websites, Bohai Group’s official corporate documents, and the 
CSRC documents.  See Ba yue fa zhi jiao dian hui gu [August Legal Focuses], RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S 
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the first open trial in China involving a public investor seeking damages 
against a listed company under the false statement doctrine.5  In the same 
month, the Ha’erbin Intermediate People’s Court made a judgment in Chen 
Lihua v. Daqing Lianyi Corporation on the same grounds.6  These two cases 
are representative of earlier judicial application of the false statement 
doctrine in civil securities litigation in China. 
Despite its short history, the stock market in China has experienced 
considerable ups and downs since its establishment in the early 1990s.  By 
the end of 2005, the number of listed companies in the securities market had 
increased from fewer than twenty to 1,381.7  The total value of the stocks 
trading in the open market reached RMB 3.24 trillion (US$405 billion) in 
2005.8  However, in spite of its early rapid development, there has been a 
downturn in the stock market since 2000. For example, the Composite Index 
of Shanghai Stock Exchange has declined from over 2,073 at the end of 
2000 to 1,161 in 2005.9  The majority of public investors have suffered 
serious loss in recent years, including most institutional investors.10   
The large scale misconduct of listed companies played a significant 
role in the downturn of the stock market.  The listed companies’ constant 
false disclosures or major omissions of material information garnered broad 
attention, both within the stock market and among society generally.  For 
example, cases of listed companies making false statements occurred every 
month in 2001.11  Pervasive misconduct as well as the poor performance of 
many listed companies exhausted investors’ trust and confidence in the 
market.12  Many scholars have pointed out that the securities market cannot 
                                                                                                                              
NETWORK], Oct. 12, 2004, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/8217/29997/30337/ 
2914061.html. 
5
 Ba yue fa zhi jiao dian hui gu, supra note 4. 
6
 Chen Lihua su Daqing Lianyi Gongsi [Chen Lihua v. Daqing Lianyi Corporation] (Higher 
People’s Court of Heilongjiang, Dec. 21, 2004), ISINOLAW (last visited Apr. 18, 2006) (hereinafter Daqing 
Lianyi); see Xin Wei, Da qing lian yi xu jia chen shu bei qi shu [Daqing LianYi was Sued for False 
Statement], SHANGHAI FAZHI BAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL RULING NEWS], available at 
http://shszx.eastday.com/epublish/gb/paper4/12/class000400005/hwz639842.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 
2006). 
7
 CSRC Statistical Information, Summary by Shares Categories, available at http://www.csrc. 
com.cn/en/statinfo/index_en.jsp?path=ROOT>EN>Statistical%20Information (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).   
8
 Id. (Major Index).  
9
 Shanghai Stock Exchange, Data of Composite Index of Shanghai Stock Exchange from 1989 to 
2006, available at http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/ps/zhs/ggxx/zsjbxx.jsp?indexName=&indexCode= 
000001 (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
10
 See Shi Guohua, supra note 2. 
11
 Jian Fu, Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance in Listed Companies in China: From 
Yinguangxia to Enron, AUSTRALIAN J. CORP. L., available at 2004 AJCL LEXIS 13, 10.   
12
 Xu Binglan, Securities Legislation Protects Investors, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 28, 2005, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/28/content_419958.htm. 
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be revitalized without an effective mechanism to monitor and prevent such 
misconduct.13   
A system of civil compensation through judicial processes is often 
regarded as the most popular candidate for such a mechanism.  Under 
current law, although a listed company that conducted fraud or made false 
statements might be fined by administrative agencies,14 or the directors of 
the company may be punished by criminal statutes,15 public investors who 
have suffered serious financial losses due to the companies’ fraud or other 
misconduct do not have legal remedies.  Public investors need greater 
protection, and the current legal system is woefully insufficient.  To address 
the inadequacies of the system, in 2003, the Supreme People’s Court of 
China (“SPC”)16 issued its judicial interpretation under the title of “Some 
Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Trying Cases of Civil 
Compensation Arising from False Statement in Securities Market” (“SPC 
Provisions”).17  For the first time, a SPC judicial interpretation provided 
substance and procedures for aggrieved public investors seeking civil 
damages against a listed company that made false statements.   
The causation test in the SPC Provisions soon became the dispositive 
issue of the false statement doctrine after the SPC’s promulgation of the SPC 
Provisions.  The relationship between cause and effect can be very 
complicated in civil securities litigation.18  One cause might result in 
multiple effects while one effect may result from multiple causes.19  In a 
stock transaction, it is often very hard for a plaintiff investor to prove that 
                                           
13
 See, e.g., Chen Sheng, Min shi ze ren zhi du yu zheng quan fa zong zhi de shi xian [The 
Realization of Civil Liability System and Goals of Securities Laws], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [NEWSPAPER OF 
PEOPLE’S COURT], Dec. 12, 2001.  
14
 See Shi Xiaobo, Zhong guo zheng quan shi chang xu jia chen shu min shi ze ren gou cheng yao 
jian yan jiu [A Study of the Composing Elements of Civil Liability for False Statements in China’s 
Securities Market], 142 ZHONGNAN CAIJING ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO [J. ZHONGNAN U. ECON. & L.] 105, 
105-106 (2004); see also Yu Guanghua, Rang wei fa zhe you su song wei ji gan [Litigation Threat to 
Violators], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SEC. DAILY], Sep. 26, 2002, available at 
http://www.cs.com.cn/csnews/20020926/282439.asp. 
15
 See Shi Xiaobo, supra note 14, Yu Guangua, supra note 14.   
16
 The highest court in China [hereinafter SPC].  
17
 Guan yu shen li zheng quan shi chang yin xu jia chen shu yin fa de min shi pei chang an jian de 
ruo gan gui ding [Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation 
Arising from False Statement in Securities Market] (promulgated on Dec. 26, 2002, effective on Feb. 1, 
2003) [hereinafter SPC Provisions] LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).  
18
 Liu Junhai, Lun zheng quan shi chang fa lv ze ren de li fa he si fa xie tiao [Legislative and Judicial 
Conciliation of Legal Liability of the Securities Market], 25 XIANDAI FAXUE [MODERN LAW SCIENCE] 3, 
10 (2003); see also Chen Jie, Lun zheng quan  min shi pei chang zhong yin guo guan xi de tui ding [Finding 
the Causal Relationship in Securities Cases for Civil Compensation], ZHONGGUO FAXUE WANG [NAT’L 
INSTITUTE OF LAW], available at http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=1365 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2006).  
19
 Id.  
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the alleged false statement is the sole or significant cause of the investor’s 
loss.20  Many plaintiffs have lost their cases merely because they failed to 
sufficiently demonstrate that the company’s false statement was in fact the 
sole cause of their losses in the stock transaction.21  A trial court’s 
interpretation and application of the causation test under the SPC Provisions 
has become determinative in deciding the false disclosure dispute between a 
public investor and a listed company.22    
This Comment argues that a trial court should broadly interpret the 
causation test of the false statement doctrine to protect the interests of public 
investors in cases where public investors seek monetary damages against the 
listed company for its false statements.  Part II describes the establishment of 
the false statement doctrine and the causation test through market practice 
and the development of the legal system.  Part III analyzes the confusion of 
the causation test in the SPC Provisions and tries to demonstrate the possible 
readings a trial court may have when applying it to cases.  Part IV analyzes 
the application of the causation test in Zhang He v. Bohai Group and Chen 
Lihua v. Daqing Lianyi Corporation.  Finally, Part V explains why the trial 
court should adopt a broad approach in applying the causation test in civil 
securities cases.   
II. THE CAUSATION TEST OF THE FALSE STATEMENT DOCTRINE WAS 
FORMALLY ESTABLISHED THROUGH THE PROMULGATION OF THE SPC 
PROVISIONS 
The false statement doctrine in China’s securities laws has its roots in 
general civil liability cases in tort and contract.  Under the General 
Principles of the Civil Law, a party that acquired property as a result of fraud 
should compensate the other party for losses that are caused by the fraud.23  
However, the concept of this doctrine of fraud was not fully developed in 
private securities litigation when the Securities Law was first promulgated in 
                                           
20
 Id.; see also Shao Zongwei, Judicial Interpretation to Curb Fraud in Stock Trading, CHINA 
DAILY, Oct. 7, 2002, at 1.  
21
 See Li Minghui & Xie Jun, Lun xu jia chen shu min shi su song zhong yin guo guan xi de ren ding 
[The Determination of the Causation in Civil Litigation for False Statements], 9 GUOJI MAOYI WENTI 
[INTERNATIONAL TRADE PROBLEMS] 60 (2003).   
22
 See Yin Shaoping, Xu jia chen shu pei chang an zhong yin guo guan xi de pan duan [The 
Determination of Causation in Civil Damage Cases Under the False Statement Doctrine], ZHONGGUO 
ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SEC. DAILY], Sept. 10, 2004, available at http://www.cs.com.cn/ 
csnews/10/01/15/200409100243.htm.  
23
 See MIN FA TONG ZE (P.R.C.) [GENERAL CIVIL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF THE P.R.C.], 
Chairman’s Order 1986 No. 37, available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696 (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2006) (Articles 58(3) and 61 are related to civil liability for fraud). 
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1994.  Instead, the doctrine developed to fulfill the needs of the stock market 
and legal practice. 
The false statement doctrine in securities laws is a special category of 
the doctrine of fraud applied in general civil compensation cases.  In the 
context of securities laws, the false statement doctrine under the SPC 
Provisions allows a public investor to seek civil damage against a listed 
company,24 where (1) the listed company has made a false statement 
consisting of either untruthful information or omission of material 
information, (2) the public investor has suffered loss in his stock 
transactions, and (3) the listed company’s false statement has caused the 
public investor’s loss.25  Thus, the false statement doctrine can be 
summarized by three elements: the false statement, actual losses, and the 
causation test.  A public investor who brings a lawsuit against a listed 
company under the false statement doctrine will receive monetary 
compensation based on his actual financial loss if he can prove all three 
elements at trial. 
In most cases, the falsehood in the company’s public documents and 
the investor’s loss can be easily found because of the broad definition of 
false statement under the SPC Provision.26  A false statement can be any 
untruthful disclosure or major omission of material information.27  The 
investor’s loss can be found through the records of transaction prices.  
However, the causal relationship between the false statement and the 
investor’s loss remains difficult to discern even after SPC issued its judicial 
interpretation of the doctrine and the test.28 
A. The Protection of Public Investors from Listed Companies’ False 
Statements Was Not Contemplated During the Establishment of the 
Stock Market  
The modern stock market in China is still very new, but it has 
developed rapidly.29  The Chinese government established the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991,30 which 
                                           
24
 This Comment only discusses listed companies who have made false statements.  Under the SPC 
Provisions, defendants can include intermediate agencies in the stock market such as law firms, accounting 
firms and brokerage firms.  
25
 Li Minghui & Xie Jun, supra note 21, at 60.  
26
 See SPC Provisions, supra note 17, art. 17. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Shao Zongwei, supra note 20; Li Minghui & Xie Jun, supra note 21, at 60. 
29
 See Hui Huang, China’s Takeover Law: A Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 30 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 145, 148-49 (2005).  
30
 Id. at 148.  
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became the national stock exchanges in China.31  Individual investors 
compose the majority of trading accounts in China’s stock market.32  There 
are over 72 million securities trading accounts in China today.33  A little 
more than half of the individual investors have an annual income below 
RMB 20,000 (US$2,418).34  Many individual investors do not have the 
necessary financial or investment knowledge of securities to conduct trading 
in the stock market.35  
One of the primary motives of the Chinese government in establishing 
a stock market was to further the reform of state-owned enterprises.36  Since 
the mid-1980s, the Chinese government started to delegate some power to 
state-owned enterprises through contracting between the government and the 
enterprises.37  However, the management of the contracting enterprises 
lacked long-term objectives under the contracting system because all of the 
appointed managers were “officials affiliated with government agencies and 
had no incentive to improve the enterprises’ performance.”38  The 
shareholding system in enterprises was proposed and established to “provide 
a means of raising capital, management means, and motivation 
mechanisms.”39  Since the establishment of the stock market, the 
government has emphasized the interests of state-owned enterprises and 
their revenue-producing capability.40  Though the government tried to realize 
the role of the enterprises in light of their independent management, the 
government did not contemplate the potential liability that such an 
independent enterprise might have to assume with regard to its public 
investors.41 
                                           
31
 Jian Fu, supra note 11, at 4.  
32
 Jiong Deng, Building an Investor-friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System in China, 46 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 347, 347-48. 
33
 Id at 347-48. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Hong Jun, Zheng quan shi chang xu jia chen shu ji qi min shi pei chang ze ren [False Statements 
in Securities Market and Civil Liability], LIAONING JINGJI [LIAONING ECONOMY], Sept. 2003, at 76, 76-77. 
37
 Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the Emerging Securities 
Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 62, 74 (1993). 
38
 Id. at 74-75. 
39
 Id. at 76. 
40
 Hong Jun, supra note 36, at 76. 
41
 See id. 
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B. The Initial Development of Securities Laws Nurtured the False 
Statement Doctrine but Failed to Provide a Sufficient Private Cause of 
Action  
The uniform national regulations of the stock market in China started 
with the Interim Regulation on the Issue and Trading of Shares (“IRITS”) on 
April 22, 1993.42  Before the promulgation of national regulations, both 
Shanghai and Shenzhen municipal governments enacted administrative 
measures to regulate the stock transactions in their regions.43  In 1992, the 
State Council Securities Committee (“SCSC”) and the CSRC were created 
to form “a nationwide regulatory policy” as a response to the existence of 
national stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen.44  Together, the SCSC and 
the CSRC promulgated the IRITS.45  
The IRITS narrowly defines the liability of the corporations, 
promoters, and intermediaries for violating the duty of disclosure.  The 
IRITS requires that the listed companies correctly reveal material corporate 
information.46  However, its explicit regulation on falsification is limited to 
only the information disclosed in the initial public offering of stocks 
(“IPO”).47  Moreover, violators for misinformation are only subject to 
administrative penalties.48  The IRITS does not hold the violators liable to 
public investors.  
The first Securities Law49 in China defined the company’s liability but 
failed to provide a sufficient legal mechanism under which a public investor 
could seek private remedies.  Although the Statute provided that a company 
should be liable to its investors for their losses in the course of securities 
trading that resulted from the company’s misinformation, it did not provide 
an explicit cause of action to public investors.50  Moreover, fines remitted by 
                                           
42
 Gu piao fa xing yu guan li zan xing tiao li [The Interim Regulation on the Issue and Trading of 
Shares] [hereinafter IRITS], State Council’s Order 1993 No. 112, available at 
http://www.cnlawservice.com/chinese/law&regulation/flcx/b62.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).  
43
 Benjamin R. Tarbutton, China—A National Regulatory Framework for the PRC’s Stock Markets 
Begins to Emerge, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 411, 415-16 (1994).   
44
 Id. at 420. 
45
 Id. 
46
 IRITS, supra note 42, ch. 6.  
47
 Id. art. 17, 21, 73.  
48
 Id. art. 74.  
49
 Zheng quan fa (P.R.C.) [Securities Law of P.R.C], Chairman’s Order 1998 No. 12, 
CHINALAWINFO (last visited Apr. 14, 2006) (hereinafter Securities Law).  The latest Securities Law of 
People’s Republic of China was issued in 2005.  Because the false statement doctrine in the SPC Provisions 
was established in accordance with the securities laws before 2003, any discussion of securities laws in this 
Comment is limited to those before 2003.  
50
 Id. art. 63; see also id. art. 24, 59, 63, 72, 177, 181, 188, 189, 202 (governing information 
disclosure of listed companies and other violators). 
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the company would go to the government instead of to the injured private 
party.51  Before the issuance of the SPC Provisions in 2003, when a public 
investor brought a lawsuit against a listed company under then-existing 
securities laws, most courts simply declared that they did not have 
jurisdiction over these cases because the Securities Law was silent about 
whether a public investor may file a lawsuit against the listed company for 
its false statement.52   
C. The SPC Issued Its Circular to Complement the Legal Insufficiency of 
the Securities Law on Civil Liabilities for Falsehood of Information 
The stock market in China experienced a downturn since 2000 despite 
its rapid development in earlier years.53  The Composite index of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges continuously declined until 
2005.54  The majority of public investors suffered serious loss as a result.55  
Numerous cases of fraudulent information disclosed by listed 
companies diminished the public investors’ incentive to invest and 
significantly contributed to the downturn of the stock market.56  Misconduct 
of the listed companies, particularly in the form of false disclosure, has 
plagued the stock market in China since the early 1990s due to insufficient 
legal remedies.57  Shenzhen Yuanye Industry Corporation became the first 
company de-listed from the stock market in 1992 for its illegal conduct, 
which included false statements regarding the source and amount of its 
investment capital.58   
On September 21, 2001, the SPC decided that the courts, for the time 
being, would not hear any cases seeking civil damages for insider trading, 
fraud, market manipulation, and other misconduct of listed companies and 
intermediate stock agencies.59  This decision was a result of the absence of 
civil liability provisions in the Securities Law.  Courts were unable to protect 
individual investors due to the absence of statutes governing false statements 
                                           
51
 Id. art. 177.  
52
 Liu Junhai, supra note 18, at 4. 
53
 See Shanghai Stock Exchange, supra note 9.  
54
 Id.   
55
 See Shi Guohua, supra note 2.   
56
 See Cui Yihong, Guan yu wo guo zhen quan min shi pei chang ze ren wen ti de fa lv si kao [A 
Thought on Civil Liability in Securities Cases in China], 16 XI’AN CAIJING XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. XI’AN 
INST. FIN. & ECON.] 63, 63 (2003). 
57
 Jian Fu, supra note 11, at 9. 
58
 Id. at 10-11.  Listed companies who have falsified material information include the Qingminyuan 
Company in 1998, Sichuan Hongguang Company in 1998, Lantian Shareholding Compay and Yiguangxia 
Company in 2001, and Daqing Lianyi Company in 2002.  Id.  
59
 Sun Min & Li Jing, Corporate Fraud before the Courts, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 12, 2003, at 2. 
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in securities cases and providing for civil compensation.60  Individual public 
investors lost not only their money but also their trust in the stock market 
because of the listed companies’ fraudulent conduct on such a large scale.61  
The revitalization of the stock market must include a civil compensation 
system to deter listed companies from making false statements, provide 
remedies for investors’ losses resulting from companies’ violations of law, 
and reconstruct investors’ trust and confidence in the stock market.   
To address the legal insufficiency of the Securities Law in civil 
litigation, the SPC issued a Circular in January 2002 establishing the 
jurisdiction of courts over a dispute between public investors and listed 
companies on false statements.62  This Circular explicitly provides that a 
court must hear a civil securities case on the issue of a false statement when 
a plaintiff files the lawsuit based on the CSRC’s confirmation of a 
defendant’s violation.63  However, the Circular does not provide any 
substantive or procedural rules to the application of false statement cases.  It 
does not define what constitutes a false statement, nor does it specify the 
allocation of burden of proof.64  In practice after the Circular was issued, 
though courts had jurisdiction over the cases to address the interests of 
public investors, they had trouble determining the rules governing civil 
securities cases.65 
                                           
60
 See Chen Sheng, supra note 13; Xin Zhiming, Bring Companies That Lie to Court, CHINA DAILY, 
Jan. 21, 2002, at 4. 
61
 Xu Binglan, supra note 12. 
62
 Guan yu shou li zheng quan shi chang yi xu jia chen shu yin fa de min shi qing quan jiu feng an 
jian you guan wen ti de tong zhi [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on the Relevant Issues Concerning 
the Acceptance of Civil Tort Dispute Cases Caused by False Statements in the Securities Markets] 
(promulgated on Jan. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Circular], CHINALAWINFO (last visited Apr.14, 2006).  The 
SPC has authority to interpret the judicial application of laws and rules.  Its judicial interpretation through 
issuance of circular is a common practice in China.  The SPC’s authority of judicial interpretation is partly 
described in the Article 33 of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/misc/2005-07/08/content_13200.htm. 
63
 Circular, supra note 62, art. 2.  
64
 Li Guoguang, Wo guo zheng quan shi chang si fa su song de shi jian wen ti yu qian jing [The 
Practice, Challenges and Prospect of Securities Litigation in China], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [NEWSPAPER 
OF PEOPLE’S COURT], June 21, 2002.  Li Guoguang is the Vice Chairman of the Supreme People’s Court in 
China.   
65
 See Jia Wei, Shen li zheng quan shi chang xu jia chen shu min shi pei chang an jian de ji ge yi nan 
wen ti [Several Difficult Questions Regarding Judicial Hearing of Civil Compensation Cases for False 
Statements in Securities Market], RENMIN CIFA [PEOPLE’S JUDICARY] 9 (May, 2002).  
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D. The SPC Provisions Have Fully Established the False Statement 
Doctrine in Civil Securities Litigation  
The SPC Provisions help establish the legal foundation for the courts 
to protect individual investors through civil compensation.66  They contain 
eight chapters including general, substantive, and procedural provisions.67  
The substantive provisions include Ascertainment on False Statement, 
Causes for Liability Fixation and Exemption, and Ascertainment for 
Losses.68  Procedural provisions include Entertainment of Cases and 
Jurisdiction, Litigation Methods, and Liability for Joint Torts.69  
The causation test of the false statement doctrine is described in 
Articles 18, 19, and 20 of Chapter IV Ascertainment on False Statement.70  
Article 18 defines the circumstances in which the causal relationship can be 
established in false statement cases:71  
(a) The investor’s transactions of the securities are directly 
related to the false statement; 
(b) The investor buys the securities on or after the date of false 
statement, and before the exposure date or correction date; 
(c) The investor suffers loss from selling the securities after the 
exposure date or correction date or from continuously holding 
the securities. 
Under Article 18, the plaintiff investor has the initial burden of proving that 
the company made false statements causing plaintiff’s losses.72  For a causal 
relationship to exist, a public investor in lawsuits against the listed company 
must show that a false statement made by the defendant company will 
directly affect the transaction of securities.73  For example, a listed company 
may report an increase in revenue, which in turn causes the stock price to 
increase.  Moreover, the causal relationship is structured in terms of 
timing.74  Thus, the plaintiff must prove that he either bought or sold the 
                                           
66
 The SPC Provisions were approved in December 2002 and publicized on January 15, 2003. 
67
 See SPC Provisions, supra note 17.  
68
 Id. 
69
 Id.  
70
 See id. arts. 18, 19, 20. 
71
 Id. art. 18.  
72
 See id.  
73
 Id. art. 18(a)  
74
 Id. art. 18(b), (c).  
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securities during a certain period of time to establish the causal 
relationship.75   
By contrast, Article 19 lists circumstances that exclude the existence 
of the causal relationship:76 
(a) The investor has sold the securities before the revelation 
date or correction date;  
(b) The investor conducts a transaction of the securities after the 
revelation or correction date;  
(c) The investor conducts a transaction despite his/her knowing 
the existence of the false statement;  
(d) The investor’s loss or part of the investor’s loss results from 
the systematic risks of the securities market or due to reasons 
other than the false statement;  
(e) The investor invests maliciously.  
Under Article 19, the defendant company bears the burden of proof.77  As 
long as the defendant can prove one of the illustrated circumstances under 
Article 19, the court will find no causal relationship between the plaintiff 
investor’s loss and the defendant’s false statement.  Article 19 generally 
assumes that the effect of the false statement on the securities prices and 
investors’ behavior no longer exists once the false statement is disclosed or 
the investor has actual knowledge of the false statement.78  
Article 20 provides definitions of three important dates in finding a 
defendant’s liability:79  
(a) The date of the false statement is the date when the false 
statement is made or occurs;  
(b) The revelation date is the date when the false statement is 
initially exposed in national media including newspapers, radio 
stations, and TV stations;  
                                           
75
 Id.  
76
 Id. art. 19. 
77
 Article 19 provides that “the defendant produces evidence” with respect to the listed 
circumstances under this Provision.   
78
 Jia Wei, Zheng quan shi chang xu jia chen shu min shi an jian de pe ichang fan wei [The Scope of 
Compensation in Civil False Statement Cases in Securities Market], RENMIN CIFA [PEOPLE’S JUDICARY], 
Nov. 2002, at 9, 10. 
79
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(c) The correction date is the date when the person who made 
the false statement announces and corrects the false statement 
on the media that are designated by the CSRC to disclose 
securities market information and also suspends the trading of 
the securities in accordance with provided procedures.  
The definition provision is particularly important in finding the specific time 
of disclosures, which ultimately determines causation.  It is directly related 
to Article 18’s provisions.  
Through the SPC Provisions, the causation test of the false statement 
doctrine is formally established in securities litigation where individual 
investors may seek civil damages against listed companies that have violated 
the disclosure requirement in the Securities Law.  Articles 18 and 19 not 
only provide circumstances for finding or excluding the causal relationship 
but also allocate the proper burden of proof between the plaintiff investors 
and the defendant companies.80  The plaintiff investor does not need to prove 
the defendant’s actual knowledge of the false statement so long as the 
evidence suffices to satisfy Article 18 requirements.  On the other hand, the 
defendant can rebut the claim by proving any circumstances provided under 
Article 19 to deny the existence of causal relationship between the plaintiff’s 
loss and the defendant’s false statement. 
The formal establishment of the false statement doctrine is, to a large 
extent, a response to the legal inadequacy of securities laws and trust crisis 
in the stock market.  Despite its origin in the general civil laws promulgated 
in the 1980s, the application of the false statement doctrine in securities 
litigation was not fully conceptualized in the initial development of 
securities laws.  The SPC formally established the doctrine through its 
judicial interpretation in assuming the courts’ jurisdiction over securities 
litigation brought by public investors seeking monetary damages.  The 
causation test contained in Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the SPC Provisions has 
become the key issue in false statement cases. 
III. THE CAUSATION TEST IN THE SPC PROVISIONS IS CONFUSING AND 
OPEN TO SEVERAL POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS 
Despite the SPC’s efforts to provide an unambiguous and thorough 
interpretation of the false statement doctrine, confusion exists not only in the 
plain meaning of the provisions but also from the application of the 
causation test in legal practice.  The provisions related to the causation test 
                                           
80
 See id. arts. 18, 19.  
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contain three major problems: the arguable relationship between Article 
18(b) and 18(c), the loose definitions of the revelation date and correction 
date under Article 20, and the uncertain scope and effect of systemic risks 
under Article 19.    
A. Whether a Plaintiff Should Prove Both Article 18(b) and 18(c) or Only 
One of Them to Meet the Causation Test Is Arguable   
Article 18 is the key to understanding the causation test of the false 
statement doctrine.  Article 18 states that a court shall find that a listed 
company’s false statement is the cause of a public investor’s loss if the 
public investor can prove that he is under the illustrated circumstances of 
Article 18(a), 18(b), and 18(c).81  Article 18(a) requires that the plaintiff 
investor have traded the stock that is directly related to the defendant 
company’s false statement.82  In most cases, the plaintiff has suffered losses 
from buying and selling the stock issued by the defendant company.  The 
proof of a “direct relationship” under Article 18(a) rarely arises as an issue 
before a court.   
Article 18(b) and 18(c) lay down the other two possible 
circumstances: (1) an investor buys the stock after the false statement date 
and before the disclosure date83 and (2) an investor sells or holds the stock 
after the revelation/correction date.84  In the original text of the SPC 
Provisions, no connector exists between Article 18(b) and 18(c).85  If the 
connector between Article 18(b) and 18(c) is “and,” only plaintiffs who buy 
the stock before the disclosure date and sell or hold after the disclosure date 
can sustain the burden to prove the causal relationship under the false 
statement doctrine and therefore receive appropriate compensation for their 
losses.  If the connector is “or,” both plaintiffs who buy before the disclosure 
date, and those who sell or hold afterwards, may receive their compensation.  
The choice between “and” as opposed to “or” becomes important because it 
determines how many investors may survive the causation test under the 
false statement doctrine and eventually win their cases.  
The plain meaning of the causation test provisions does not answer 
the question of whether Article 18(b) and 18(c) are connected by “and” or 
                                           
81
 See id. art. 18. 
82
 Id. art. 18(a). 
83
 Id. art. 18(b).  The disclosure date is the earlier of the revelation date or the correction date, 
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under Article 18.  
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 Id. art. 18(c). 
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 See id. art. 18.  
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“or.”  On the one hand, the connector between Article 18(b) and 18(c) seems 
to be “and” by reading Articles 18 and 19 together.  Article 19(a) explicitly 
excludes a causal relationship when an investor sells the stock before the 
disclosure date.86  If the connector between Article 18(b) and 18(c) is “or,” 
an investor may prove the causation test when he buys the stock after the 
false statement date and sells before the disclosure date under Article 18.  
This is certainly inconsistent with Article 19.  
On the other hand, a connector “or” is also possible if one examines 
the structure and the coherent use of wording of the two articles.  Article 18 
imposes the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish a causal 
relationship.87  By contrast, Article 19 imposes the burden on the defendant 
to provide evidence to rebut the plaintiff’s allegation.88  These two articles 
are parallel to each other in the statutory structure.  In addition, both Article 
18 and Article 19 employ the exact same wording before their respective 
illustration of circumstances that a people’s court shall (Article 19 here 
includes “not”) find a causal relationship “under any of the following 
circumstances”.89  The text seems clear enough that no causal relationship 
exists under Article 19 whenever one of the Article 19 circumstances is 
proven.90  This strongly indicates that a causal relationship can be shown by 
any of “the following circumstances” of Article 18(b) and 18(c).91   
However, an investor’s reasonable reactions to different false 
statements support the use of the connector “or” between Article 18(b) and 
18(c).  In an article explaining the false statement doctrine, one of the SPC 
Judges points out that the causation test in the SPC Provisions is drafted 
according to the different effects of two types of false statements on 
investors’ transactional behavior.92  A false statement can be either falsely 
optimistic or falsely pessimistic information about a listed company.93  For 
example, suppose a listed company falsely announces a revenue increase.  
The company’s stock price increases accordingly and investors purchase the 
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 Id. art. 19(a). 
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 See id. art. 18; Jia Wei, supra note 78, at 10.  
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 SPC Provision, supra note 17, art. 19; Guo Feng, Zheng quan shi chang xu jia chen shu ji qi min 
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default.asp?id=15810 (last visited Apr. 16, 2006). 
89
 SPC Provision, supra note 17, arts. 18, 19.  
90
 See id. art. 19.  
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listed company’s stock relying on the false revenue increase news.  The 
stock price decreases and the investors suffer losses on or after the date 
when the company’s false statement is disclosed, and the company has not 
performed well enough to increase its revenues.  Presumably, the stock price 
will not be negatively affected by the false statement before its disclosure.  
Thus, the causal relationship can only be found when an investor sells or 
holds the stock after the revelation or correction date.94  
Similarly, a false statement that reports untruthfully pessimistic 
information about the company can also cause the investors’ loss.95  Even 
though most companies are inclined to make falsely optimistic statements, 
the opposite scenario also exists.96  Many scholars have criticized the 
causation test in the SPC Provisions as insufficiently conceptualizing the 
pessimistic false statement scenario.97  Investors who suffer losses from the 
false bad information should be equally protected.98  Sitting in equity, a court 
should find the causal relationship in cases where investors sell the stock 
before the disclosure date as well as those who hold the stock all along or 
sell afterwards, so long as the investors can prove actual losses.99    
The absence of a connector between Article 18(b) and 18(c) results in 
different readings as to what kind of investors might bring sufficient 
evidence to prove the existence of a causal relationship.  Once a court 
determines the revelation date or the correction date, it can find a causal 
relationship if the investor buys the stock before the disclosure of a 
                                           
94
 Jia Wei, supra note 78, at 10.  
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default.asp?id=14834 (last visited June 17, 2006); Chen Jie, supra note 18, at 39; Han Jin & Zhao 
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company’s falsification of information and sells or holds afterwards.100  By 
contrast, if an investor buys and sells after the disclosure date, the 
company’s false statement cannot cause the investor’s loss.101  However, 
pursuant to the principles of equity, a court may interpret the causation test 
provisions broadly to provide remedies to investors who sell the stock before 
the disclosure date. 
B. The Revelation Date and Correction Date Are Ambiguous and Offer 
Courts Wide Discretion in Interpretation   
The revelation date and the correction date are not clearly defined in 
the SPC Provisions.  Under Article 20, the revelation date is the day when 
the false statement is disclosed for the first time in the nationwide media.102  
However, the Article does not designate the authority of disclosure to any 
specific media entities.103  Few people will question the authority of a CSRC 
announcement, or one from Securities Daily, the single largest securities 
newspaper in China.  However, it is up to the courts to decide whether many 
other disclosing entities are qualified authorities under Article 20 to reveal 
false statements to the public.  
Article 20 also fails to specify the degree to which existing 
misinformation should be revealed to the public so as to constitute sufficient 
disclosure.104  After a listed company has made any false statement, many 
kinds of suspicions of its misconducts are likely to arise in the market before 
the full authoritative disclosure of the misinformation.105  Mere suspicion of 
misinformation probably does not suffice as public disclosure under Article 
20.  However, most investors will hastily sell the stock upon any suspicious 
news of the company’s misconducts.106  
The definition of correction date in Article 20 is also ambiguous.  The 
correction date occurs when the listed company announces and corrects the 
false statement on CSRC-designated media and suspends trading in its 
shares in accordance with provided procedures.107  The definition does not 
specify what kind of correction by the listed company qualifies as 
“announcement and correction” under the SPC Provisions.108  It is unclear 
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whether a company’s mere mentioning of prior misrepresentation or 
omission in one or two short sentences is sufficient.  The SPC Provisions are 
also unclear as to the required “procedures” that a company should go 
through to suspend trading.109  
A court’s determination of the revelation date and the correction date 
is essential to the causation test.  The general rule of the causation test under 
Article 18 reflects a timing structure.110  The finding of causation entirely 
depends on when the purchase and sale transactions of purchase and sale 
take place with the respect to the revelation date or the correction date.111  
When the statutory definitions are uncertain, a court understandably has 
more discretion to reach its legal conclusion.112   
C. The Scope and Effect of Systemic Risks Under Article 19 Are Subject 
to Each Court’s Interpretation 
The concept of so-called systemic risks in the SPC Provisions is not 
only ambiguous but also highly adverse to individual investors.  Article 
19(d) excludes the existence of a causal relationship if a defendant company 
proves that the investor’s loss or part of the investor’s loss results from the 
systemic risks of the securities market.113  The SPC Provisions do not define 
the concept of systemic risks.  The idea of systemic risks with respect to the 
stock market seems to presume that stock transactions are intrinsically risky 
and investors have to absorb all the consequences resulting from such 
systemic risks.114  This implicitly invites questions, such as what kind of 
evidence a defendant may introduce to prove the systemic risks, the extent of 
the burden of proof, and how a plaintiff may rebut the defendant’s allegation 
of “systemic risks.”  All of these questions are left unanswered in the SPC 
Provisions.115 
To deny causation with proof of systemic risks is potentially 
disadvantageous to investors because a defendant may exaggerate the effect 
of systemic risks to dodge its liability.  A defendant will certainly raise the 
argument of systemic risks to deny the existence of causation, since systemic 
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risks always exist in the stock market.116  Due to ambiguity in the scope and 
effect of systemic risks, a false statement case becomes highly 
unpredictable.  A plaintiff may never survive the causation test because the 
systemic risks are presumably an intrinsic part of any stock transaction and 
always related to investment losses to some degree.117  The uncertainty of 
the systemic-risk argument will deter investors from bringing cases against 
companies who have breached their duty of disclosure.  A court should be 
particularly cautious in evaluating systemic-risk arguments to prevent 
companies’ abuse of this argument as allowed for under Article 19. 
As a result, a court may exercise its judicial discretion in its 
application of the causation test due to the confusion of the SPC Provisions.    
Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the causation test contain unresolved issues that are 
open to the court’s interpretation.  The interpretation of the causation test, 
narrowly or broadly, will directly affect the conflicting interests of public 
investors and listed companies.  Filling in the gaps of the SPC Provisions, a 
court must take an explicit and firm position in carrying out its judicial role 
in the causation test.  
IV. TWO SECURITIES CASES DEMONSTRATE JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY IN THE 
APPLICATION OF THE CAUSATION TEST  
After the SPC’s promulgation of its judicial interpretation of the false 
statement doctrine in civil securities cases, the courts have started to apply 
the SPC Provisions to pending or new securities cases brought by public 
investors seeking compensation for their investment losses resulting from 
the listed companies’ false statements.  Whether a listed company’s false 
statement is the cause of an investor’s loss becomes the key issue in many 
cases.118  Among these cases, the Jinan Intermediate People’s Court decided 
that a plaintiff investor failed to prove causation in Zhang He v. Bohai 
Group,119 while the Ha’erbin Intermediate People’s Court found the 
existence of causation between the false statement and investors’ losses in 
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Chen Lihua v. Daqing Lianyi Corporation.120  Both courts focused on the 
definition of the disclosure date and the effect of systemic risks in the 
causation test of the false statement doctrine.121  Nevertheless, the two courts 
reached different conclusions in the causation test, which ultimately 
determined the result between the investors and the companies.  
A. The Court in Zhang He v. Bohai Group Found No Causal 
Relationship 
The facts of this case indicate a relatively straightforward incidence of 
a false statement.  In 1993, Bohai Group acquired Jinan Matches Factory.122  
In its acquisition and merger report as part of its “Public Announcement,” 
Bohai Group announced that a bank offered it favorable interest rate loans 
for the acquisition.123  However, Bohai Group did not disclose the fact that it 
would not be able to enjoy the low interest benefit until the banks reported to 
their supervisory bank and received final approval.124  Instead, Bohai Group 
became a defendant in a lawsuit filed by one bank for the interest 
payment.125  From 1994 to 1998, Bohai Group never counted its interest 
expenses for acquisition loans in its annual financial statements.126  In 1999, 
Bohai Group added its interest expenses from 1994 to 1998 in its 1999 
interim financial statements.127   
From March 2000 to November 2001, the CSRC conducted a series of 
investigations into potential false statements by listed companies.128  The 
CSRC found that Bohai Group, among sixteen other listed companies, made 
false statements in violation of the Securities Law.129  The CSRC further 
publicized Bohai Group’s false statement in its Letter of Administrative 
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Penalty on November 5, 2001.130  Every listed company whose false 
statement had been investigated and discovered by the CSRC received such 
a penalty letter, which constituted a confirmation of the listed company’s 
wrongdoing and the administrative prerequisite to file a civil lawsuit by a 
public investor against the listed company.131  
Plaintiff Zhang He was a clerk working at a bank’s branch office in 
Zaozhuang, Shandong.132  On August 16 and 17, 2001, he purchased a total 
of 1500 shares of the defendant company’s stocks at the price of RMB 
18,435 (US$2,304).133  The stock price decreased continuously after his 
purchase.134  On January 29, 2002, after the publication of the Letter of 
Administrative Penalty to the defendant in November 2001, Zhang sold the 
stock at the loss of RMB 9,434 (US$1,179).135  Zhang filed the lawsuit in 
February 2002 asking for RMB 9,930 (US$1,241) in damages, which 
included the loss from the stock transaction and other related costs.136  
The Jinan Intermediate People’s Court decided for the defendant on 
the ground that a causal relationship did not exist between the defendant 
company’s false statement and Zhang’s loss in his stock trading.137  The 
Court found no causal relationship established in the case for two reasons.  
First, Bohai Group corrected its prior false financial information in 1999 
while Zhang purchased the stock in 2001.138  Thus the trial court concluded 
that Zhang could not have relied on the defendant’s false statement when he 
traded the stock and that his stock transaction was not causally related to the 
defendant’s false statement.139  Second, Bohai Group successfully proved 
that Zhang’s loss resulted from the systemic risks in the stock market rather 
than from his reliance on the company’s false statement.140  The Court 
reasoned that stock transactions were full of risk and that public investors 
had to consider and bear the risk resulting from fluctuations in the market.141  
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The Court found that the defendant sustained its burden of proof by 
demonstrating the decreasing Composite Index of the whole stock market 
during the period of time when Zhang was conducting his transaction.142  
The Jinan Intermediate People’s Court’s reasoning in support of its 
decision raises serious concerns about the likelihood that a plaintiff will 
survive the causation test in a false statement case.  The court’s finding of 
the disclosure of the false statement in 1999 is questionable.  According to 
the court, Bohai made false statements in 1994 and corrected the 
misinformation in its financial statements in 1999.143  Zhang purchased the 
stock in August 2001.144  In November 2001, the CSRC announced its Letter 
of Administrative Penalty to Bohai Group.145  Zhang sold his stock at a loss 
in January 2002.146  If Bohai Group had corrected its false statement in 1999, 
Zhang’s trading after the disclosure of Bohai Group’s misconduct could not 
have caused his loss.  If Bohai Group’s false statement was not disclosed 
until the CSRC’s issuance of the penalty report in November 2001, Zhang’s 
purchase in August 2001 and sale in January 2002 would meet the most 
rigorous causation test under Article 18.  In that scenario, Zhang obviously 
bought before the disclosure date and sold afterwards.   
While the CSRC’s penalty letter would undoubtedly be considered 
authoritative national disclosure of the defendant’s misconduct under Article 
20, it is arguable whether Bohai Group’s 1999 financial statements qualify 
as a “correction” under the SPC Provisions.  In its 1999 Interim Report, 
Bohai Group merely mentioned that it had settled with the bank with regard 
to the interest payment and would pay all the interests from 1994 to 1999 
that it owed to the bank.147  Bohai Group did not explicitly and affirmatively 
confess the fact that it did not disclose the interest expenses in its financial 
statements from 1994 to 1998.148  It was very unlikely that a reasonable 
investor would consider this a sufficient disclosure of Bohai’s prior 
misinformation.  The facts on record do not sufficiently support the court’s 
finding that Bohai Group had corrected its false statement in 1999.    
In addition, the court overemphasized the effect of systemic risks in 
this case.  At trial, Bohai presented the Composite Index of Shanghai Stock 
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Exchange.149  During the period of time when Zhang traded the stock, the 
Composite Index of the stock market went down continuously.150  In reliance 
on the gloominess of the market as a whole, the court concluded that 
systemic risks, rather than Bohai’s false statement, was the real cause of 
Zhang’s loss.151  This conclusion entirely ignored the individual performance 
of a company’s stock in the stock market.  The stock market is not only risky 
but also dynamic.  The performance of the stock market as a whole will 
certainly exert some influence on the price of one stock.152  Nevertheless the 
gloominess of the stock market never precludes the possibility of price 
increases of individual stocks.153  The decrease of a stock’s price can be 
attributable to multiple causes.154  The court’s attribution of the cause solely 
to systemic risks is neither persuasive nor equitable to public investors.  
The Jinan Intermediate People’s Court’s denial of the causal 
relationship in Zhang’s case reflects not only the confusion in the causation 
test of SPC Provisions but also the insurmountable obstacle that an investor 
will encounter in a false statement case.  The court’s finding of a correction 
date lacks sufficient factual support.  Its overemphasis of systemic risks 
opens the door to potential abuse in counter-proving the causation between 
the defendant’s misconduct and the plaintiff’s loss in false statement cases.  
Based on the court’s reasoning, a defendant can easily rebut a plaintiff’s 
allegation on the ground of systemic risks and shake off the liability.  Many 
lawyers and public investors have expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
trial court’s reasoning,155 because the trial court did not perform its judicial 
role properly and failed to protect the interests of the individual investor in 
this false statement case.156 
B. Public Investors Won a Compromised Victory in Chen Lihua v. Daqing 
Lianyi, Inc. Due to the Court’s Finding of Disclosure Dates 
The facts of the Daqing Lianyi case are more complicated than that of 
Bohai Group.  The plaintiffs were twenty-three individual investors who had 
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been involved in Defendant Daqing Lianyi Corporation (“Daqing Lianyi”) 
stock transactions.157   
Daqing was incorporated in Heilongjiang Province.  Lianyi Shihua 
Factory (“Lianyi”) was Daqing’s predecessor.158  On April 26, 1997, Lianyi 
published a Prospectus on behalf of Daqing Lianyi.159  The Prospectus had 
included untruthful revenue information so as to attract public capital.160  
Daqing Lianyi issued its IPO on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in May 
1997.161  On March 23, 1998, Daqing Lianyi again untruthfully reported a 
revenue increase in the “1997 Annual Report.”162  The misconduct of Daqing 
Lianyi, and of its predecessor Lianyi, caused the attention of some 
governmental supervisory agencies.163  At the request of a supervisory 
agency, the Board of Daqing Lianyi published a “Board Announcement” in 
Securities Daily on April 21, 1999, admitting that Daqing Lianyi was under 
investigation for falsifying revenue increases in its 1997 Annual Report.164  
On April 27, 2000, the CSRC issued its Letter of Administrative Penalty to 
Daqing Lianyi and determined that Daqing Lianyi committed fraud in its 
IPO and its 1997 Annual Report.165 
The twenty-three plaintiffs brought suit against Daqing Lianyi at 
Ha’erbin Intermediate People’s Court after the issuance of the CSRC Letter 
of Administrative Penalty to Daqing Lianyi.166  The plaintiffs had started 
trading Daqing Lianyi stock in May 1997 and sold or held the stock around 
April 27, 2000.167  The plaintiffs sought RMB 960,063 (US$120,007) in 
damages under the false statement doctrine.168  
Daqing Lianyi, as a defense, argued that no causal relationship existed 
between the plaintiffs’ loss and any false statement made by Daqing Lianyi 
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or its predecessor Lianyi.169  Daqing Lianyi did not deny its misconduct in 
making false statements, nor did it question whether the plaintiffs actually 
suffered loss.  Rather, Daqing Lianyi tried to deny the existence of a causal 
relationship under the false statement doctrine.170  At trial, Daqing Lianyi 
argued that the revelation date was not April 21, 1999, but rather April 27, 
2000 when the CSRC issued its Letter of Administrative Penalty.171  Daqing 
Lianyi believed that its Board Announcement on April 21, 1999 about the 
investigation of its alleged false statement was merely a warning to the 
public of potential transaction risks.172  In addition, Daqing Lianyi claimed 
that the systemic risks in the stock market were the real cause of the 
plaintiffs’ loss.173   
The trial court decided for the plaintiffs on the issue of causation and 
the appellate court affirmed.  The appellate court found that April 21, 1999 
was the correction date of the false statement in Daqing Lianyi’s 1997 
Annual Report when its board announced the ongoing investigation.  The 
court found that April 27, 2000 was the revelation date of Daqing Lianyi’s 
false statement in its 1997 Prospectus when the CSRC issued its Letter of 
Administrative Penalty.174  In addition, the appellate court found that Daqing 
failed to prove that systemic risks were the cause of the plaintiffs’ loss.175  
The court awarded the plaintiffs their actual loss of RMB 425,388 
(US$53,173).176  The award was about half of the plaintiffs’ claimed 
damages because the court’s loss calculation was based on its finding of the 
revelation date and the correction date.177 
The trial court made a substantial effort to support its finding of 
causation.  However, the court’s finding concerning disclosure dates is still 
problematic.  Daqing Lianyi fabricated its revenue information in its 
Prospectus in April 1997 and made similar false statements in its Annual 
Report in 1998.178  In 1999, the Board of Daqing Lianyi announced that it 
was under investigation for allegedly making false statements.179  In April 
2000, the CSRC issued its Letter of Administrative Penalty, confirming 
Daqing Lianyi’s fraud in its IPO and misrepresentation in its Annual Report 
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in 1998.180  All the plaintiffs started trading Daqing Lianyi stock in May 
1997 and continued until April 2000, when the CSRC official announced 
Daqing Lianyi’s misconduct.181  Daqing Lianyi attempted to persuade the 
court that its false statement was not disclosed until 2000 when the CSRC 
confirmed Daqing Lianyi’s fraud and misrepresentation.182   
The most rigorous causation test requires, under Article 18, that the 
investor sell after the disclosure date.183  Many plaintiffs sold the stock 
before April 2000.184  If the court adopted Daqing Lianyi’s argument, the 
plaintiffs’ sale of the stock before April 2000 would negate the causation 
between Daqing Lianyi’s misinformation and most plaintiffs’ losses.  By 
contrast, the plaintiffs tried to prove that the Board’s announcement of the 
investigation determined the disclosure date in 1999.185  If the court adopted 
the plaintiffs’ argument, all the stock sales after 1999 and before 2000 would 
satisfy the causation test.  Because the Board Announcement date occurred 
one year earlier than the Letter of Administrative Penalty date, the court’s 
adoption of either party’s argument would result in significant differences in 
loss calculation.   
Instead of choosing between the two arguments, the court reached its 
own conclusion regarding the disclosure dates.  Affirming the trial court’s 
decision, the appellate court found that the Board Announcement in 1999 
disclosed Daqing Lianyi’s misrepresentation in its Annual Report while the 
Letter of Administrative Penalty in 2000 disclosed Daqing Lianyi’s fraud in 
its Prospectus.186  Although the CSRC’s report was an official announcement 
of both Daqing Lianyi’s IPO fraud and later misrepresentation, it was 
difficult to tell whether the announcement of investigation revealed all false 
statements or merely Daqing Lianyi’s misrepresentation in its Annual 
Report.187  The court’s decision concerning the disclosure dates was a 
compromise between the two parties’ contentions, with neither party 
winning completely.  Based on this compromise, the court awarded the 
plaintiffs half of their claimed damages in its loss calculation.188  
Both the trial court and the appellate court found in favor of the 
plaintiffs regarding Daqing Lianyi’s systemic risks argument.189  The 
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appellate court admitted that the causation test did not define the meaning of 
“systemic risks.”190  According to its own understanding, the appellate court 
concluded that systemic risks were “risks affecting the prices of all stocks in 
the market” and beyond the control of individual companies.191   
The court further identified two steps that a defendant company 
should take to sufficiently rebut the causation.  First, the defendant must 
present the specific facts that constitute so-called systemic risks.192  Second, 
the defendant must prove that such specific facts have caused the price 
fluctuation in the whole stock market.193  The court made it clear that a 
decrease in the Composite Index of the stock market as a whole was not 
sufficient evidence to prove the effect of systemic risks.194  
This case represents a victory for investors in false statement cases in 
which the causation test is applied.  The plaintiffs did not receive all the 
claimed damages because of the court’s compromise in the determination of 
disclosure dates.  Nevertheless, through its own interpretation of systemic 
risks, the court successfully mitigated the overwhelming adverse effect that 
the systemic-risks argument could impose on investors’ cases.  Though the 
plaintiffs did not win completely, they created an example of how investors 
may rebut the argument of systemic risks in the causation test in civil 
securities cases. 
V. THE JUDICIARY SHOULD PLAY A PROTECTIVE ROLE TOWARD PUBLIC 
INVESTORS IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE CAUSATION TEST IN CIVIL 
SECURITIES LITIGATION 
In the interests of bolstering investor confidence, courts should 
interpret the causation test in favor of public investors in close false 
statement cases where public investors seek civil compensation against listed 
companies for fraud, misrepresentation or major omission of material 
information.  As discussed above, proof of causation is often crucial in 
contests between public investors and listed companies.195  Bound by the 
SPC Provisions, courts must apply the most rigorous causation test based on 
the rigid timing structure of Article 18.196  Many investors whose losses are 
attributable to defendant companies’ false statements might be excluded 
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from receiving compensation.  However, with limited discretion, a court 
should protect public investors’ interests with the causation test.  Both 
current government policy and the success of China’s economic reform 
require substantial judicial protection of the interests of public investors in 
civil securities litigation.  In addition, due to the confusion surrounding the 
causation test in the SPC Provisions, an explicit position of a court in favor 
of public investors in close cases not only saves transaction costs but also 
enhances judicial certainty and consistency. 
A. Courts Should Evaluate the Totality of the Circumstances in 
Determining the Revelation and Correction Dates 
To find the right revelation or correction date, a simple review of facts 
relating to when the false statement was revealed or corrected is insufficient.  
Due to the timing structure of the causation test, the determination of the 
date will either prove the causation or completely deprive a plaintiff of 
compensation.197  Each party tries to persuade the court to pick the date in its 
favor.  When investors file a lawsuit employing the false statement doctrine, 
they usually have already stopped trading the alleged stock.  The timing of 
their trading is decisive at trial.  By contrast, the defendant company is likely 
to have a choice between the CSRC’s announcement and its own corporate 
activities which may indicate the defendant’s prior false statement.  For 
example, in Bohai Group, the defendant company managed to persuade the 
court that the defendant’s own adjustment in financial statements amounted 
to a “correction” or “revelation” under Article 20.198  In Daqing Lianyi, the 
defendant company argued that the Board announcement was merely a 
warning and did not constitute a “revelation.”199  The company contended 
that the CSRC’s announcement was the official “revelation” of the 
company’s false statement to the public.200 
Instead of a factual review to decide the timing of the revelation or 
correction, a court should examine the unveiling effect of the alleged 
“revelation” or “correction.”  The timing structure of the causation test 
presumes the causal effect the disclosure of a false statement will exert on 
investors’ transactions and losses.201  According to this presumption, the 
false statement will not affect the stock price before or long after its 
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disclosure, but will cause a price change upon its disclosure.202  Therefore, a 
court should question whether the alleged “revelation” or “correction” has 
brought about such disclosure. 
A court must evaluate all relevant factors in finding the revelation or 
correction date with respect to the disclosing party, the means of disclosure, 
and the extent of disclosure.  The CSRC’s issuance of a Letter of 
Administrative Penalty for a listed company’s false statement is an 
unquestionable “revelation” under Article 20.203  In most cases, whether the 
alleged corporate activity amounts to sufficient disclosure is the issue before 
the court, but no single factor is dispositive.  A court must examine the 
totality of the circumstances and consider the effect of the alleged corporate 
activity from the perspective of a reasonable investor.  
B. Courts Must Firmly Prevent the Abuse of the Systemic Risks Argument 
A court should be skeptical when presented with the systemic risks 
argument.  Under Article 19, the proof of systemic risks constitutes a 
sufficient rebuttal to causation between the alleged false statement and the 
plaintiff’s loss.204  If a defendant succeeds in the systemic risks argument, 
the plaintiff loses both the contest over the causation test and the entire 
lawsuit.  Despite the significance of the systemic risks argument,205 the SPC 
Provisions neither define the meaning of systemic risks nor specify the 
burden of proof.  This presents certain unintended problems.  Due to the 
uncertain yet destructive effect of the systemic risks argument with respect 
to causation, every defendant may invariably claim that the investment loss 
is a result of systemic risks.  In both Bohai Group and Daqing Lianyi, the 
defendant companies spared no effort in persuading the courts to adopt this 
argument, though the outcomes differed.206  The potential abuse of the 
systemic risks argument imposes additional obstacles to the plaintiffs’ case 
beyond the rigorous timing structure of the causation test.  A court must 
cautiously deal with the systemic risks argument and try to undermine its 
overreaching destructive consequence in a false statement case.  
The judiciary should send a clear message to the community of its 
opinion about the systemic risks argument.  The SPC Provisions leave the 
rule of systemic risks open to the courts.  On the issue of systemic risks, a 
court should not reach a conclusion, especially in favor of a defendant 
                                           
202
 Id. 
203
 See SPC Provisions, supra note 17, art. 20. 
204
 Id. arts. 11, 19(d). 
205
 See supra Part III. 
206
 See Bohai Group, supra note 4; Daqing Lianyi, supra note 6. 
SEPTEMBER 2006        SECURITIES LITIGATION IN CHINA 761 
 
company, without a thorough interpretation of the rule.  The court must solve 
two problems in its interpretation of systemic-risks: (1) identifying the 
systemic risks and (2) deciding what burden of proof a defendant should 
bear.  In Daqing Lianyi, the appellate court adopted a two-step test.207  The 
court required that a defendant arguing systemic risks as the cause of the 
plaintiff’s loss demonstrate the specific facts of systemic risks.208  In 
addition, the defendant would be required to prove that those specific facts 
caused the price change in the stock market.209  A court of another province 
does not have to adopt the same two-step test.  Yet every court in its own 
interpretation of the rule should ensure the requirement of specific 
arguments and a relatively high burden of proof.  Otherwise, few plaintiffs 
who have in fact suffered losses from the listed company’s false statement 
may prevail in the causation test.  
C. Current Government Policy, Revitalization of the Stock Market, and 
Judicial Consistency Justify Judicial Protection of Investors’ Interests 
A considerable disparity in the power between public investors and 
listed companies calls for judicial protection of public investors’ interests.  
Most Chinese investors, referred to as “scattered households” (san hu),210 are 
individual investors.  Each san hu is one of “thousands of passive actors” in 
the stock market and barely has any control over or impact on other 
participants like the listed companies.211  Public investors face many more 
disadvantages than listed companies.  Most investors are middle class 
workers and the average share ownership of each investor is very limited.212  
Few investors possess the necessary basic knowledge about stock investment 
and they are often subject to fraud at the hands of stock issuers.213  In 
addition, local governments tend to favor the interests of local companies 
listed in the stock market and often help cover up fraud.214  As a result, 
public investors are usually unable to fight against the oppressive behavior 
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of the more powerful participants in the stock market, such as the listed 
companies’ fraud or misleading disclosure.215  To redress that imbalance for 
public investors, the judiciary should perform its role in terms of fairness 
and equity in private securities litigation.216  
Protection of public investors is one of the top agendas of current 
Chinese government policy.  Many listed companies were transformed from 
state-owned enterprises.217  One of the primary purposes in establishing a 
stock market in China was to raise sufficient capital for state-owned 
enterprises from the public.218  Many listed companies manipulated the stock 
market “as a channel to pool investors’ money.”219  Overall, investors’ 
interests were not in contemplation of the initial design of the stock market 
and corresponding legal mechanism.  The tone then changed in 2000, with 
investor protection becoming a major concern in recent years.220   
In 2004, the State Council issued the Opinions on Promoting the 
Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Markets.221  In its opinion, 
the State Council repeatedly called for the protection of public investors’ 
rights and interests.222  This policy declaration signified the central 
government’s determination to protect public investors.223  Furthermore, 
protection of public investors’ interests was one of the primary reasons for 
the revision of China’s Securities Law.224  Ensuring public investors’ rights 
and interests was the top priority of CSRC, for which it earnestly lobbied 
law-makers.225  In judicial practice, judges should interpret and apply the 
rules of law in private securities litigation in a way that echoes this policy.   
The revitalization of the Chinese stock market requires forceful 
judicial protection of public investors’ interests.  Due to the inadequacy of 
legal protection, listed companies are more interested in raising money but 
have less incentive to improve their performance.226  Before the 
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promulgation of SPC Provisions, numerous investors who had suffered 
losses in reliance on fabricated information could not receive any remedy 
from wrongdoers.  Consequently, investors’ confidence diminished and the 
stock market deteriorated.227  A protective judicial role toward public 
investors is necessary to redress the listed companies’ past wrongdoings and 
to deter them from violating the law in the future.  A private securities case 
can involve a large number of plaintiffs.228  Companies are more likely to 
comply with their duty of disclosure under the threat of massive liability.229  
In addition, the assurance of legal protection and remedy helps to revitalize 
investor confidence and attract more funds from the public.230  As scholars 
suggest, a realistic remedy for infringed investors, offered by a legal 
decision-maker such as a judge in a private securities case, is probably the 
only assurance of social stability and harmony in the development of China’s 
capital markets.231  
A uniform judicial attitude to protect public investors enhances 
judicial certainty and consistency in private securities litigation.  Most 
plaintiffs in private securities litigation are individual investors.232  Both 
their investment and potential for loss are very limited.  The uncertainty in 
judicial practice raises their costs, considering the time and expense of a 
lawsuit.  In contrast with general tort lawsuits, a private securities lawsuit 
may be filed by numerous plaintiffs against the same defendants for the 
same cause in different courts.233  It is very likely that different courts may 
conclude differently for cases arising from the same cause.234  For example, 
though the parties were different in Bohai Group and Daqing Lianyi, one 
court ruled against the defendant’s systemic-risks argument while the other 
court agreed with the defendant, yet the defendants in the two cases 
presented similar evidence and adopted the same reasoning in the same 
rebuttal against causation of the false statement doctrine.235  The 
inconsistency between the lower courts will “jeopardize the reputation and 
credibility of the legal system.”236  Where class action lawsuits are not yet 
permitted in private securities litigation in China, the best solution is for 
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lower courts to adopt a uniform and explicit judicial position in favor of 
public investors in a contested false statement case.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Private securities litigation is a necessary legal mechanism to deter 
listed companies from misconduct and to protect the interests of public 
investors.237  However, the earlier securities laws in China failed to provide 
such a legal mechanism and public investors had no sufficient cause of 
action against violators for stock trading losses as a result of listed 
companies’ false statements.  The SPC formally established the false 
statement doctrine in private securities litigation through its judicial 
interpretation.  Nevertheless, public investors are still facing challenges to 
win their cases and gain monetary compensation due to the confusion 
contained in the causation test of the SPC Provisions.  Two cases 
demonstrate that different interpretations of the causation test by the lower 
courts can eventually determine the outcome of a private securities dispute.   
Lower courts hearing private securities cases should play a protective 
role toward public investors in their application of the causation test.  
Protection of public investors’ interests reflects current Chinese government 
policy.  In addition, it is also vital to reconstruct the confidence of public 
investors in the stock market.  The judiciary must perform its adjudicatory 
role to punish the wrongdoers and compensate the victims so as to assure the 
stability of the capital market in China. 
                                           
237
 See Chen Sheng, supra note 13.  
